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JOSE MARIA JESUS CARVAJAL, UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FILIBUSTERING SPIRIT
IN TEXAS, 1846-1853
by John Maretta
James K. Polk, an austere and methodical president, was seldom
eloquent in his public addresses. Even his last message to Congress
discussing the chief accomplishment of his administration - doubling the
size of the nation at the cost to Mexico of one-half of hers - was typically
uninspiring. "The acquisition of California and New Mexico, the
settlement of the Oregon boundary, and the annexation of Texas, extending
to the Rio Grande, are results which combined, are of greater consequence,
and will add more to the strength and wealth of the nation than any which
have preceded them since the adoption of the Constitution."! Though
colorless in presentation, Polk's utterance accurately reflected majority
public opinion regarding the nation's recent acquisitions from Mexico.
Rabid exponents of Manifest Destiny wanted more, but Polk was content
with what he had gained. The problem now, the president said, was to
establish legitimate governments in the new territories.
Unfortunately there were few individuals - Mexican or Anglo-
Americans - willing to develop these regions peacefully. Mexico never had
governed effectively the vast Borderlands (Alta California, New Mexico,
Arizona, and Texas prior to 1835), and after the Mexican War was unable
to maintain order in the provinces immediately south of the Rio Grande -
the states of Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon. Even before the war
Mexican separatists from the region had conspired with Anglo-Texans
from across the river to establish an independent northern republic forged
out of these states. One of the most determined and genuine of these
norteno revolutionaries was Don Jose Maria Jesus Carvajal, who together
with his Anglo-Texan allies, kept the lower Rio Grande in a constant state
of insurrection between 1851-1853. Carvajal's movement also caused a
serious strain in United States-Mexican relations which took several years
to pacify.
A tejano from Victoria and son-in-law of empresario Martin De Leon,
Carvajal first appeared on the Texas political scene in 1835 when he was
elected to the legislature of Coahuila-Texas. Prior to his election he had
been enjoying the life of an hacendado, managing an estate of over 4,000
acres near the coast in southeast Texas between the Lavaca and Guadalupe
rivers. Carvajal spoke English fluently, a skill he had acquired during his
adolescence thanks to the efforts of Stephen Austin who had befriended the
young tejano and arranged for him to attend an academy in Bethany,
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Virginia, operated by the evangelical Disciples of Christ. Carvajal
remained at the school for four years, and by the time of his return to Texas
in 1828, his English was "nearly perfect in every form of verbal
expression."2
Tensions already were high betwecn Anglo-Texans and the Mexican
government by the time Carvajal joined the provincial assembly. He and
other delegates further antagonized Mexico City by passing a law
authorizing the government to sell 400 leagues of land to recent Anglo
emigres. The legislature's action was a blatant violation of Mexican law,
which since the early 1830s forbade the sale of further Texas land to any
individuals, Mexican or Anglo. Carvajal and the other members of the
legislature were accused of conspiracy against the Mexican government
and were ordered arrested. Mexican authorities believed Carvajal and his
cohorts were merely using the decree to further strain relations between
Mexico City and Coahuila-Texas, hoping to provoke Texans to armed
rebellion. Upon hearing of the order for his arrest, Carvajal quickly fled
across the Sabine into Louisiana, eventually making his way to New
Orleans. There he and other Tex.an refugees helped procure supplies for the
Texas forces. 3
The Texas Revolution official1y began in September 1835, and three
months later, on December 20, at Goliad, Texans announced their indepen-
dence from Mexico. In November, while attempting to bring arms into
Texas for rebel forces, Carvajal was captured by Mexican authorities and
imprisoned at Matamoros. However, while being transported to Vera Cruz
for confinement, Carvajal escaped his guard, eventually making his way
back to Texas in time to sign the declaration of independence. He then
joined various rebel contingents, seeing limited action in skinnishes with
Mexican troops chasing Texan armies all around southeast Texas. Carvajal
was elected a delegate to the convention at Washington-on-the Brazos
where the Republic of Texas was declared on March 2, 1836. Carvajal
never made it to the convention, and soon after the Texan victory at San
Jacinto, he disappeared for the next three years.4
The reasons for Carvajal's disappearance after San Jacinto can only be
sunnised. Perhaps like other tejanos, Carvajal realized that the new
Republic of Texas was to be for Anglos only, and that he and eventually all
Mexican-Texans would soon be deprived of their pre-revolutionary statllS.
Even before the rebellion Anglo-Americans made their contempt for the
Hispanic community well known. Disdain for tejanos became especially
acute by the late 1830s with the influx of aggressive Lower South Anglos
into Texas to exploit the region's rich bottomlands for cotton cultivation.
These newcomers openly violated all Mexican laws, refusing even the
most modest compliance, considering the native Mexicans to be the
intruders. As the movement for an independent Texas gathered momentum
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during the early 1830s, its leadership reflected this Lower South influence.
Although many tejanos such as Carvajal opposed the increased
authoritarianism of Mexico City, joining with their Anglo counterparts in
protest, and eventually fighting and dying for an independent Texas, they
soon discovered that Anglo-Texans were determined to strip them of their
wealth and influence and relegate them to second-class citizens in their
own country. Perhaps Carvajal sensed that this would be his fate l and
instead of remaining in Texas, he retreated into Mexico, waiting there until
conditions were conducive for a return home.
Carvajal never returned to Texas, at least legally. Tejano influence in
the aftennath of independence declined rapidly. By the time of Texas
annexation in 1845, many had been removed from political positions, and
their land was confiscated and sold to Anglo planters or yeoman. As a
result, a once proud and affluent people found themselves driven, over the
next three decades, into poverty and oppression. Watching his people's
degradation! and not wanting to suffer the same humiliation, Carvajal
decided after 1836 to stay in Mexico. Though abandoning his birthplace l
Carvajal maintained his ethnic identity, eventually transforming his
tejanoism into a devotion to norteno separatism (palria Chica), which he
expressed over the next several years by engaging in rebellion against the
centralist autocracy of Mexico City.
While contemplating his future in Mexico, Carvajal befriended
General Antonio Canales, who for several years had engaged in
conspiracies against the centralist regime in Mexico City. Canales wanted
to organize the northern Mexican states of Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and
Nuevo Leon into an independent republic, and actively sought a coalition
with Texas for his scheme. Carvajal was one of several hundred volunteers,
both Anglo and tejano, who joined Canales' movement in 1839. At a battle
near Mier, Carvajal was badly wounded l eventually losing the use of his
left ann. Though routed by the centralists in every engagement and forced
to retreat across the Rio Grande into Texas, Canales proclaimed the
establishment of the RepUblic of the Rio Grande, appointing Carvajal
secretary of the governing council. Chronically short of supplies and not
really welcomed in Texas, by 1840 Canales had no choice but to surrender
to the centralist forces. He dismissed his Texas auxiliaries, merging what
was left of his Mexican soldiers with those of the centralists commanded
by General Mariano Arista. Canrajal, however, remained true to the
separatist cause, and now was considered the undisputed leader of the
struggle for northern Mexican independence. Soon after his break with
Canales, Carvajal returned to his ranch in Tamaulipas..'l
Canales saw an opportunity to revive his scheme for establishing an
independent northern Mexican republic when in June 1845, American
forces commanded by General Zachary Taylor appeared on the south bank
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of the Nueces River. Taylor had been ordered to his position by President
James K. Polk, who believed a Mexican invasion of Texas was imminent
because of the republic's recent annexation by the United States. Since
Texas independence in 1836, Mexico City threatened the United States
with war if Texas was ever made part of the Union. No sooner was Taylor
encamped along the river than Canales sent an emissary to the general's
base. That agent was none other than Carvajal, who had emerged trom his
self-imposed exile at Tamaulipas a year earlier. Apparently Carvajal no
longer felt any animosity toward his fanner compadre, for soon after his
reappearance, he and Canales reunited. Much to Carvajars delight,
Canales had rejoined the Federalist cause.6
Carvajal was to seek American help to destroy the Mexican army,
"long the scourge of the nation," and to fonn a separate republic with "a
constitution based on the rights of man" - a colloquialism for a Federalist
republic. Carvajal was to negotiate with Taylor for arms for 3,000 men,
which Carvajal promised would be turned against the "usurper," Mariano
Paredes y ArrilJaga, who recently had overthrown the government of Jose
de Herrera. In return, the Carvajal-Canales junto pledged to do all in its
power to support American claims to Texas, as well as the repaying of
loans by customs arrangements or by boundary adjustments.'
Carvajal's offer appealed to the Polk Administration, for one of the
president's plans to prevent war with Mexico was to support the secession
movement of the northern states. Taylor submitted Carvajal's plan to
Secretary of War William Marcy, who, like Polk, believed the Canales-
Carvajal plan had possibilities. Marcy, however, refused to provide the
rebels with arms or money, not completely trusting that they would be used
against the Paredes government. 8 The deal was off.
When war with the United States began late in the spring of 1846,
Carvajal commanded a 425-man cavalry contingent but was so reluctant to
fight the American armies advancing through Mexico that the corrunander
of the northern Mexican forces, General Francisco Mejia, suspected him of
secret collaboration with the enemy and only grudgingly supplied him
with material. Carvajal's engagement of American forces was so sporadic
and half-hearted that many of his own men suspected his motives. Some
even believed el jefe was fighting with the Mexicans merely to keep the
United States out of northern Mexico so that he could establish a "little
republic" independent of Mexico City.9 Carvajal's purpose was exactly that
- to create the Republic of the Rio Grande. Thus, he was not at all
interested in helping the centralists in Mexico City.
In the fall of 1846, the Canales-Carvajal junto tried again to persuade
the Polk Administration to help them detach the northern Mexican states.
Secretary of State James. Buchanan was visited "by a person named Aelaria
de Masa, M.D., who represented himself to be a Mexican citizen residing
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in Tamaulipas. The letter of this person represented that the inhabitants of
the Northern Provinces of Mexico were ready to revolt & establish an
independent Republic, & would do so if they could have a guaranty [sicJ
from the U.S., 1st, that they would not be annexed to the U.S., and 2nd,
that we would protcct & defend them in their contemplated revolution as
long as war lasted with the U.S." Though attracted to the de Masa proposal,
Polk was reluctant to commit immediately to it, fearing "it might seriously
embarrass the U.S. when we came to make peace with Mexico."'o
Although personally desiring the taking of more territory from Mexico
thilll just the Borderlands, Polk was dissuaded from such a move by the
secretary of state, who "expressed his opinion strongly against acquiring
any more Southern territory, & said he thought jf we did it would be the
means of dissolving the Union." Buchanan's warning reflected the division
and political dissension the war already had caused within the nation,
From the conflict's beginning the majority of Whigs opposed the war in
principle, arguing (correctly) that the United States had no valid claims to
the area south of the Nueces River. Though voting for mi litary
appropriations while the war was being fought, Whig congressmen
nevertheless criticized the president for starting it. More ominous was the
charge of antislavery northerners from both parties that the war's real
purpose was to spread slavery, thus increasing the "s]aveocracy's" political
power. While battles were being fought in Mexico, Congress debated the
Wilmot Proviso to prohibit slavery in any territory acquired from Mexico.
Foremost on Buchanan's mind was the issue of slavery expansion. He
believed the majority of northerners would consider any move by the
administration to annex even portions of Mexico as a Southern
"conspiracy" to acquire more slave territory. The secretary thus told Polk
that "if it was believed by the people [northerners] that our object was to
make a conquest of Tamaulipas & New Leon & annex them to the U.S. the
war would be utterly odious.l 'll
After further consultation with his cabinet, Polk, "upon full
reflection," decided not to provide arms or money to Mexicans resisting
Paredes, or any other regime that might come to power during the course
of the war, Much to Carvajal's and Canales' disappointment, Polk also
refused to guarantee the recognition of the northern Mexican states'
independence after the war. 12 It seems Polk had little confidence or trust in
the will of the Mexican people to strike for freedom and form a stable
government.
After the war the disorderly conditions along the Rio Grande
worsened, creating the perfect environment for filibustering. Banditti
marauding occurred more frequently, and smuggling, always a problem,
reached a point of serious contention between the United States and
Mexico. The administration responded by instructing Robert Hughes,
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United States district attorney for Texas, to conduct an extensive
investigation. Hughes, in turn, asked Ovid F. Johnson, a Brownsville
newspaper editor and merchant, to lead the inquest. In a detailed letter to
Hughes, Johnson dismissed the Mexican charges as "alleged aggression
and insults, when carefully considered are very trivial border broils."
Although admitting that Hafter the war with Mexico, a refuse population on
both sides of the Rio Grande," was «ready for any enterprize, lawful or
unlawful that presents itself:' Johnson believed the trouble was largely the
fault of Mexican officials whose "enforcement of the revenue system is
most uncertain and inefficient." Then, in a display of Anglo-Saxon
righteousness, Johnson accused both local Mexican authorities and
citizens of "not having verey [sic] conscientious scruples of duty in favour
of its [the collection of duties] rigid execution. Evasions are practiced and
winked at by many of these officers and citizens, which seem to our view
extraordinary. The government of Mexico cannot be ignorant of these
facts, nor can it doubt that the only remedy against the evil, must be
furnished by its own vigilance, and not by the agency of the United
States."13
Unfortunately for the Fillmore administration, Johnson's assessment
could not have been more inaccurate. The smuggling was hardly "the acts
of a few persons influenced by motives of a private nature," nor was
American complicity in these activities simply "a few individuals avalling
themselves of opportunities to evade the revenue laws.~"4 Johnson was
either completely ignorant of the real situation or was lying, perhaps to
cover up his own involvement in illicit trade. Johnson was in fact part of
an Anglo smuggling ring operating out of Brownsville. Whatever the
reasons, Johnson's report led the Fillmore Administration to believe that
conditions along the Rio Grande no longer required the president's serious
consideration.
In the summer of 1851 Robert Hughes resigned as United States
district attorney for Texas, and within weeks of his departure, the "trivial
border broils" escalated into a potentially explosive international crisis. As
long as the flituation remained leaderless, the government believed it had
little to worry about. Endemic lawlessness was simply part of frontier life,
particularly along the lower Rio Grande valley. The government was
shaken with the reemergence of "Don" Carvajal. In a matter of weeks
Carvajal and his band turned the supposedly minor border problems into a
general uprising. For three years - beginning in 1848 - Carvajal had been
planning an insurrection of the northern provinces of Tamaulipas and
Nuevo Leon, wanting to fonn a new state called the Republ1c of the Sierra
Madre. Offering the promise of land and loot, Carvajal rallied to his cause
many Anglo-Texan "border dwellers." Of great concern for the United
States was the ability of revolutionists such as Carvajal to raise recruits
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from ex-officers and ex-soldiers of the United States army. For a variety of
reasons, Anglo-Texans, efipecially ex-Texas Rangers, found filibustering a
particularly appealing new career. Thus from the beginning of his exploits
Carvajal had the support of many ex-Texas lawmen. For quite some time
regular law enforcement agencies considered the Rangers "men of
unsettled hahits," who, since their disbandment by the state legislature in
August 1851, were "left without occupation or means of subsistence," and
were now "ready for anything that offered to fiupply their necessities.Hls
Perhaps the most famous Texas Ranger joining Carvajal was Captain
John Salmon Ford, who almost single-handedly made the Colt revolver the
most popular and effective frontier weapon. During his career as a Ranger,
Ford received the nickname "Rip" for his habit of turning in lists of the
men he killed - "in the line of duty of course" - with "R.I.P." nex.t to their
names, which was the abbreviated version for "rest in peace." Incredibly
tough, ruthless, profane, in general "a dowmight ornery fellow," Ford
personified the type of Anglo-Texan that Carvajal's promise of money and
plunder appealed.11>
In September 1851, Carvajal formally "pronounced" against the
Mexican government in his Plan de la Loba. Carvajal's decree called for
the removal of the Mexican army from the northern provinces and a drastic
reduction in duties and tines for contraband, as well as a promise to allow
American goods to flow across the river duty free for five years. Soon after
announcing his plan Carvajal was forced to flee to Brownsville where he
immediately negotiated with local Anglo merchants to supply him with the
guns and other goods he needed to separate the northern states. In return,
Carvajal promised merchants that under his new regime the Rio Grande
would become a free-trade zone. 17
It was at this juncture that the Fillmore Administration began worrying
about "the trivial border broils." Secretary of State Daniel Webster ordered
federal officials in Texas to conduct investigations along the Rio Grade.
New United States district attorney for Texas, William Pitt Ballinger, was
placed in charge of the investigation. Ballinger was instructed by Webster
to keep the Department of Smte informed "of all those who may be found
within your district engaged in expeditions against the possessions of a
friendly power. You are to report directly to this Department all movements
along the Rio Grande that may be considered by the Government of
Mexico as a violation of our Neutrality Laws with them, as well as any
other unlawful acts committed by U.S. citizens in the area."l8
Webster's directive took Ballinger by surprise, for he, too, was under
the impression based on his predecessor's reports, that all was relatively
calm along the Rio Grande. Ballinger had ,just taken over from Hughes
when he received Webster's letter, and consequently only had time to
"conduct a very hasty & cursory investigation." Ballinger nevertheless
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reassured Webster that "the otticers of the government in Texas may be
relied on as ready and determined to do everything in their power to
prevent any such movement from this state against Mexico." After
conducting his canvass, Ballinger, like Hughes, concluded "that a revolt is
contemplated in the northern provinces of Mexico, and that Mexican
officers, civil & military, are engaged in it and endeavoring to obtain
assistance from this side of the Rio Grande, are all rumors circulated by
local newspapers."'')
While federal officers were busy with their fact-finding, Carvajal
began his revolution. In late September 1851, Carvajal, with an anny of
100 Mexicans and seventy Americans, easily captured the village of
Camargo, remaining there until early October. The surrounding towns of
Mier and Guerrero also fell to the insurgents. Federal authorities in Texas
did not hear of Carvajal's taking of Camargo until October 3, 1851, about
three weeks after the town was occupied. Ballinger quickly sent a message
to Webster, but it was obviously too late for the Fillmore Administration to
take "preventive action."20
Fillmore was reluctant to denounce American participation in
Carvajal's insurrection. His hesitancy reflected a last-ditch Whig effort to
avoid defeat in the 1852 election by championing "Manifest Destiny," even
though aggressive territorial aggrandizement was contrary to traditional
Whig foreign policy. Unfortunately, too many Americans still believed in
the rhetoric of the "regenerative" effects of Anglo-Saxon values upon
nations bluntly called "backwards." Fillmore's policies were perceived by
many a~ attempts to undermine the Republic's "redemptive" mission.
Fillmore hoped to salvage his popularity and administration by
demonstrating at least tacit support for filibustering in Mexico. Such
approval would appeal to those still believing Mexico was "'destined" to
become United States territory. Interestingly, James K. Polk probably
would have annexed a large part of northern Mexico in 1848 except for
Whig obstruction led by Senator Millard FiI1more. 21
Realizing Camargo was of little strategic importance to his cause,
Carvajal cvacuated the town on October 9, proceeding with his reinforced
army of 400 men to Matamoros. Carvajal's original 170 man contingent
was augmented by the arrival of Rip Ford's ex-Rangers, as well as other
Anglo-Texan adventurers lured by el jefe 's promise of land and 100t.22
The participation of Anglo-American mercenaries in Carvajal's insur-
rection was not the Fillmore Administration's only concern. Equally
worrisome was Carvajal's appeal among local Anglo merchants, who saw
in his rebellion the potential for immense profit. Carvajal would need
unlimited supplies for his army, and the safest, most convenient place to
procure them would be on the Texas side of the Rio Grande. The United
States Neutrality Acts of 1818 naturally forbade American citizens from
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providing aid to anyone engaged in the overthrow of the government of "a
neutral or friendly power.'~ According to Ballinger, as early as June 1851,
Carvajal came to Texas as "the agent of several Mexicans claiming or
pretending title to large grants of land between the Rio Grande and Nueces
rivers. In particular, title to what is known as the Carasillas grant,
containing 106 leagues, or about 466,000 acres." Carvajal'o;; objective was
"to exchange the grant for merchandise to introduce into Mexico, free of
the duty at the Custom House," Carvajal wanted Anglo merchants in
Brownsville "to send the goods into Mexico, paying to Carvajal 35-40% of
the amount, a considerably lower amount than the Mexican tariff." In other
words, Carvajal wanted Anglo merchants to accept as credit or security
portions of the Carasillas grant in exchange for provisions. He also hoped
to raise money by getting a "kick-back" from his Anglo suppliers whose
goods he assured would enter Mexico duty-free. By the time of his
invasion of Mexico in September, he had "introduced goods valued at
$500,000." He also had raised an additional $500,000 by selling sizeable
tracts of land from the Carasillas grant. Ballinger was convinced that "the
amount raised on the goods & the sale of the land was the mode resorted
to obtain the means for carrying his movement against the government into
effect.'l2:1
In early September 1851, Mexican customs officials - at least those
stiH loyal to Mexico City - became suspicious of the type and volume of
goods flowing across the river from Brownsville paying little or no tariff.
When they discovered that Carvajal's duty-free policy never had official
approval, they began seizing thousands of dollars of contraband. Although
the Mexican government flatly denied the complicity of its local
authorities in Carvajal lS smuggling operation, American officials in Texas
believed otherwise. Ballinger maintained that Carvajal not only had the
tacit if not direct support of local officials, but the president of Mexico as
well! According to Ballinger~ "Cardenas, the Governor, Canales~ the Lt.
Governor of Tamaulipas, were both interested in the speculation, and they
were friends of long-standing with General Arista, President of Mexico,
who it is believed by the best informed persons with whom I have
conversed, must have been aware of the order given for the introduction of
the goods & favorable to it if it could have been consummated without
involving him." Although Anglo traders stopped outfitting Carvajal
directly, they nevertheless provided his Anglo mercenaries, such as
Captain Edward Hurd, Carvajal's chief purchasing agent, with all the
stores they needed. }·1
Soon after the taking of Camargo, Carvajal's insurrection entered its
second phase. From the beginning Carvajal had the clandestine support of
"Cardenas, Canales, and Macedonio Capistran, the commander of the
national guard at Matamoros, and other persons of influence were
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doubtless pledged to the movement." American officials also believed that
had Cardenas and the others continued supporting Carvajal the rebellion
would have succeeded. As Ballinger observed, Carvajal was "a rather
popular leader of the Mexican people living in the northern provinces. He
would have been able to greatly enhance his political credibility among the
people with the presence of Cardenas & his associates." The original plan
of action was for Carvajal "to commence the outbreak in the towns on the
Rio Grande, where he had the most influence, and after his success, the
stite authorities were to unite with him and Canales was to have chief
command." No sooner did Rip Ford and his men arrive than the
arrangement fell apart. The ex-Rangers "were unwilling to be commanded
by Canales on account of his treachery to Texas in 1840, and Carvajal
elated by his success, refused to yield the leadership to Canales."
Apparently the ex-Rangers wanted to be commanded by an individual
whom they respected, liked, and knew was committed to the separatist
cause. Canales, on the other hand, already had turned against the Federalist
movement and might do so again. As Ballinger noted. when Carvajal and
his Anglo followers refused to accept Canales' command, the governor
then "turned his anns in favor of the govemment."Z5
Rip Ford's ex-Rangers were not the only Anglo-Americans enlisting in
Carvajal's crusade. Soon after the capture of Camargo, Carvajal was joined
by "a company of Americans who had assembled at Mustang Island near
Corpus Christi, under the command of Captain Howel1 Norton." Also
aiding Carvajal were several "small companies raised at the Rio Grande by
Captain Trimble which joined Carvajal at Camargo." The Mexican leader
even had a contingent of "runaway negroes. under Warren Adams, with the
professed design of returning to Texas to help free other slaves after they
had been sufficiently armed by Carvajal."26
It was believed by American officials that the Anglos joining Carvajal
were motivated by more than the lure of plunder. Although the appeal of
loot excited "many of the rank and file, a good number of whom have been
recruited from border ruffians and other dissipated individuals from our
side of the river:' such was not true for the Anglo rebel leaders. The
majority of the Anglo leaders were experienced, committed, professional
filibusters who "cared not for the pecuniary rewards their profession might
bring, but rather, to see established an independent northern republic,
doubtless in which they had been promised positions of high standing."
Ballinger was certain Carvajal's "American auxiliaries look to the
establishment of the Sierra Madre Republic as the inevitable result of his
movement if successful."2'
After twelve days of deliberation~ Carvajal attacked Matamoros on
October 30, 1851. The rebel army, whose ranks had swelled to 400 men,
won a quick victory on the first day~ taking an earthwork on the town's
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perimeter. General Francisco Avalos, commander of Mexican frontier
forces, had prepared for Carvajal's assault by evacuating women and
children and establishing barricades all around the city. Though in
possession of three six-pound cannon, Carvajal realized his guns were not
sufficient to dislodge the Centralist forces. Thus, the only way Matamoros
could be taken was by an aU-out charge which would result in hand-to-
hand fighting from building to building. Carvajal was about to launch an
assault on the plaza on the morning of November 3 when he received news
that a United States vessel was headed up the Rio Grande with supplies for
General Avalos.~~
Carvajal was outraged by this blatant act of United States support ufor
the forces of a futhless and tyrannical regime." In a letter to l.W. Phelps,
commander at Ft. Brown, which was eventually published in several Texas
newspapers, Carvajal defended both his leadership and the legitimacy of
his revolution. "When the people assembled to consider in what manner
their rights and liberties could best be preserved, by common consent,
without any agency of my own, I was chosen to lead this patriotic enter-
prize. 1 accepted the appointment with pleasure, having seen and feit the
iniquitous exactions to which my countrymen were daily subjected~ and
the despotic outrages practiced upon them by minions of power, in the
name of freedom I raised the standard of liberation, and hundreds of my
aggrieved countrymen have rushed to its support. Oppressed and borne
down upon by the organized military despotism of the Central
government.' 29
In the same impassioned rhetoric, Carvajal explained that with "the
consent of my fellow citizens," he invited some Americans to aid him in
his "righteous and just pursuit of freedom and liberty for my own people."
Carvajal then described those Americans hearing "the people of Mexico
crying out for liberation" as individuals "'who will not shame either their
country or their name - they are fighting in a cause as just and righteous
as that which has inscribed on the same roll with Washington, those other
names, noble as his allies, Lafayette. Kosciusko, and Pulaski. I hope
regenerated Mexico will be grateful in her present hour of need as the
people of the United States have been to those gallant foreigners, who, in
the dark hour of their tribulation, came to their rescue."30 One of the Texas
papers that published Carvajal's message was the Austin. Texas, State
Gazette. which declared the rebel leader's manifesto would "awaken an
enthusiastic response in every American bosom not dead to every impulse
of patriotism."31
As Carvajal's uprising continued, Ballinger interestingly became more
sympathetic toward the insurrection and its leader. As he related to
Webster, Carvajal's claim of being a national liberator was proving "to be
of greater truth than was fIrst assumed. There were many causes of
disafTection on the frontier, real grievances under which the people
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labored. General Avalos, the military commandant at Matamoros, was
universally odious; Cardenas, Canales~ and Capistran, and other Mexican
officials whose corruption and treachery were well-known, were equally
despised by the people." Though more inclined to accept Carvajal as a
legitimate revolutionary, Ballinger still had "grave reservations regarding
the true motives & desires'~ of el jefe 's Anglo-American accomplices. To
the attorney, most of these men were "brigands out for plundcr."12
Failing to take the plaza at Matamoros despite repeated charges l
Carvajal finally decided to withdraw from the city on November 8. Chased
by government troops, he retreated to Camargo, reaching the pueblo on
November 16. While recuperating at Camargo, Carvajal sent Rip Ford on
a recruiting mission into Texas. Then, in an ';outburst or rage at being
defeated at Matamoros," Carvajal attacked Cerralvo without waiting for
Ford to return with reinforcements. Cerralvo was defended by 200
Mexican troops, about the same number Carvajal had left after the siege of
Matamoros. Carvajal's other purpose in attacking Cerralvo was to capture
the town's artillery pieces, which he desperately needed to continue his
revolution. The Mexican commander at Cerralvo. General Jauregui,
knowing that hj~ town was Carvajal's next target, prepared for the rebels
by placing his cannon in strategic locations to defend the city better from
the insurgents' charges. After two days of fierce fighting in which the rebel
army failed to take even one artillery piece, Carvajal retreated. Hastening
his departure was the news that government reinforcements were fast
approaching. This time Carvajal withdrew across the Rio Grande, deep
into United State~ territory. It was reported to Webster that Carvajal
"crossed to this side of the river with his whole force, 50, or 60 miles,
where he has remained in the vicinity of Salt Lake [TexasJ. His followers
are scattered and broken into various parties & encamped at different
places." Webster also was informed "that upon his return into the territory
of the United States, his army ceased its organization. He and his officers
nominally resigned, but they could rejoin him when he again entered
Mexico."'-~ Carvajal's disbanding of hi~ forces on the Texas side of the Rio
Grande was a clever move. By doing so he avoided violating the Neutrality
Acts and thus jeopardizing his connections with his Anglo supporters.
At this juncture the Mexican government wanted to make it clear to
the Fillmore Administration that Carvajal was not a revolutionary leader of
the Mexican people and that there was little support for his cause in the
northern states. In a letter to Webster, Luis de la Rosa told the secretary that
his understanding of the frontier disturbances was inaccurate. Despite
American reports to the contrary, Webster insisted that Carvajal's actions
"are treated here as a fonnal rebellion against the Government of Mexico."
De Ia Rosa warned Webster that Mexico would expect "due and adequate
indemnification as a consequence of these invasions." Of greater concern
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to the Mexican government than the smuggling issue was the participation
of sundry Anglo-Texans in Carvajars raids, whom de la Rosa believed
were largely responsible for keeping Carvajal's movement alive. The
J\.lexican minister feared that "the emigration of adventurers from the
United States will become so numerous that the government of this
republic will find it difficult to check."34
Carvajal remained in Texas until February 1852, recruiting and
reorganizing what was left of his army. By thi!) time, though, few Anglo-
Texans were willing to rally to his grito. Perhaps Texans were tired of
fighting for what appeared to be a losing cause or following an individual
who had yet to deliver the booty he had promised. Frustrated by the lack
of response to his latest grito, and tired of waiting in an increasingly
dangerous and unfriendly Texas, Carvajal precipitously launched his
second invasion of Mexico on February 20, 1852. Camargo was again his
objective. This time government troops under his former compadre
Antonio Canales were waiting for him~ and in a brief fight, Canales routed
the filibusters, who scurried back across the Rio Grande into Texas. No
sooner was Carvajal across the border and supposedly safe than a
detachment of United States dragoons surprised the rebel leader at his
camp, arresting Carvajal and cleven of his followers on March 1, 1852.
Three days later his Anglo cohorts, Robert Wheat, E.R. Hurd, Howell
Norton, Peter Dowd, Robert Hurd, J.R. Everett~ R.R. Stansberry, and AJ.
Mason were indicted by a grant jury "for their repeated violations of
United States neutrality laws."35
The initial excitement over the indictment quickly turned to disap-
pointment. Ballinger confessed to Webster he was having "great difficulty
in gathering enough evidence of guilt to bring Carvajal to trial, which has
been our principal objective since their indictment. I must now report to
you that such evidence that is necessary is insunnountablc to obtain
because we will have to largely rely on Mexicans who do not understand
our language, as well as many who are sympathisers with Carvajal."36
Border courts, however, always have used translators in courtrooms
because most witnesses and even jure~ were comprised largely of only
Spanish-speaking Mexicans or tejanos. Evidently Carvajal still had
significant Anglo support on the border - more than most United States
officials were willing to concede.
United States officials also could not charge Carvajal's Anglo
conspirators for their violations of United States laws. According to
Ballinger's assessment, Wheat. Norton, Hurd, and the others had "evaded
but not violated the neutrality laws of the U.S. These men evaded the law
because they did not organize into companie~, electing officers &c. until
they had crossed into Mexico. Had they done otherwise - organizing their
forces on our side of the river for the purpose of invading Mexico, then we
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could charge them with the violation of the Neutrality Acts of 1818.
However, since that is not the case, 1 regret to inform you that I will not be
able to pursue them legally any further than what I have already
accomplished."37 On March 8, 1852 l Carvajal and his Anglo associates
were released on bail of $5 l 000 and $3,000 each, respectively.
Over a year later, Carvajal and his band were active. This "negligence"
on behalf of the United Statcs government prompted the new Mexican
minister to the United States, Manuel Larrainzar, to lament that the
"salutary, prompt, and energetic action" of United States authorities after
Carvajal's arrest "would begin to producc some good effects, and that the
matter would not be neglected or slighted until the claim of Mexico had
been 8atisfied~ but this has not been the case." More disturbing to
Larrainzar and his government was "the demonstration of public
sympathy" displayed by Anglo-Texans for Carvajal and his men after they
were released on bail. According to Larrainzar, such popular approval only
emboldened the filibusters "to show themselves everywhere and boast of
their actions, and the evils they have occasioned. Instead of his acts
exciting public and general indignation, he was embraced with the
outpourings of support,"38
Larrainzar then told new Secretary of State William Marcy of the
Franklin Pierce Administration that because of Carvajal's popularity in
Texas, he and his followers "continue to laugh at justice:' and defy "the
proclamations of the most Excellent President" forbidding Anglo-
American participation in any new expeditions against Mexico. Since the
filibusters' release, "these acts of violation have been repeated. The
inhabitants of the frontier have twice again seen the tenitory of Mexico
invaded, their property plundered, their lives placed in jeopardy, their
peaceful existence paralized by war and danger, the blood of thcir fellow
citizens again spilled, and the soi 1 on which they before lived, without
anxiety and fear, sullied with crimes."39
Soon after his release, Carvajal hit the south Texas "speaking circuit,"
trying to rouse Anglo support for another invasion of northern Mexico. He
was often the main attraction at local fairs, and as a result of rallies given
in his honor, he raised over $40,000 for his next campaign. The donations
given to Carvajal's cause at these expositions was due largely to the efforts
of such prominent Texans as Ashbel Smith, south Texas land baron and
commercial entrepreneur Henry L. Kinney (Kinney later organized a
filibustering enterprise to establish a colony on the Mosquito Coast of
Nicaragua), and Hugh MacLeod, ex-commander of the Lamar
Administration's ill-fated expedition to Santa Fe in 1841. All three men
accompanied Carvajal on his speaking junkets through south Texas,
touting the rebel leader as "the Savior of Mexico and the Liberator of his
People."40
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Although Carvajal had the patronage of the~e conspicuous Texans, he
had little success in raising sufficient money and men to lead an effective
rebellion in Mexico's northern provinces. Nevertheless, on March 26,
1853, Carvajal sent another force across the Rio Grande. This latest action,
however, was not a full-scale invasion, but what turned out to be an
insignificant raid of about eighty men commanded by one of Carvajal's
more loyal Anglo lieutenants, A. Howell Norton, upon the already
beleaguered town of Reynosa. As the Brownsville American Flag reported
in a scathingly sarcastic tone, Norton and his marauders easily captured the
town because "the guard was composed of five men, who they valiantly
charged upon and captured." The bandits then seized the alcalde, Garcia y
Trevino, and another municipal official, a Senor Flores, whom they held
for a ransom of $30,000. As the American Flag noted, "The enlightened
and humane leader of this pack of freebooters proved how worthy he was
of the name American, by flogging and threatening to kill his prisoners if
they did not ·put up' to a large amount in cash, which it appears is
necessary to sustain their sinking fortunes." The inhabitants raised only
$2,000, which Norton accepted, and then "retired, like a snow-ball rolling
down hill, gathering as he went horses, mules, saddles, bridles, guns - in
fact nothing appears to have bcen 'too hot or too heavy' for him to take
provided it fell into his way and was capable of being removed."41
After sacking Reynosa, Norton's band retreated to Rio Grande City on
the Texas side of the border, and there "enjoyed the fruits of their
expedition in security, under the protecting folds of the 'Star-Spangled
Banner' - whose dignity and honor is now being constantly trampled under
foot by the foreign refugee, Carvajal, supported and sustained as he is by
renegades unfortunately among us - some of whom can boast of being
Arnerican !"4~
Carvajal's stay within "the protecting folds of the Star-Spangled
Banner" was brief. Five days after the looting of Reynosa, a United States
infantry company commanded by Major Gabriel R. Paul from nearby
Ringgold Barracks, arrested Carvajal in a surprise raid on his headquarters
at Roma, Texas. The real culprit, Norton, managed to escape. Over the next
three days however, all of Carvajal's Anglo followers, including Norton,
were apprehended and sent to Fort Brown to await arraignment before the
United States commissioner at Brownsville, Frederick Cummings. The
filibusters were held in custody for six weeks at Fort Brown before
appearing in court. Once again they were released on bail ($10,000 for
Carvajal and $5,000 each for his Anglo co-conspirators) because of a
"legal technicality:" affidavits were not filed properly against them!
Cummings had no choice but to free them immediately.4~
Needless to say, the t'ilibusters were elated, and as the American Flag
reported, "Norton and his followers walk the streets with the air of men
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whose gallant conduct was the theme of universal approbation." Their
jubilation was short lived. In late April 1853, only a few weeks after their
previous arraignment, Carvajal and all eleven of his Anglo comrades were
again arrested upon a complaint lodged by the Mexican consul at
Brownsville that Carvajal was planning another raid into northern Mexico.
No sooner were the conspirators "examined before U.S. Commissioner, F.
Cummings," than once again they "were admitted to bail for their
appearance before the Federal Court for this district, to be held in
Brownsville some time in June." Even though the bail set by Cummings
was $15.000 for Carvajal and $7,000 each for his Anglo associates. they all
managed to raise the money as they had in the past, with little difficulty.44
After this latest attempt at trying to indict Carvajal for violation of the
Neutrality Acts failed, federal officials in Texas surely were convinced that
Carvajal was either the luckiest desperado they had ever come across, or
that el jeJe was indeed "destined" to be a free man in order to bring about
his revolution.
After their release, Carvajal and his followers seemed to disappear.
Many of el j(~fe's Anglo comrades gave up the filibustering business and
returned to their home states to pursue morc legitimate occupations.
Others, like Roberdeau Wheat and Howell Norton, were professional
filibusters who cared nothing for the sedentary, tedious life of a yeoman
farmer or shopkeeper. Filibustering was their trade and both men were
devoted to their "calling." Indeed, both Wheat and Norton remained
committed to filibustering. participating in many other enterprises
throughout the 1850s.
Carvajal typically returned to his ranch in Tamaulipas. He
occasionally was seen in south Texas "walking the streets of Brownsville,
telling everyone who he is and filling their heads with his past exploits."4'i
But few Mex jean officials believed Carvajal had retired from his former
occupation. Rumors abounded that he was merely biding his time, playing
the rueful ex-revolutionary while secretly organizing Anglo mercenaries
for another expedition across the river. El jefe was simply waiting for that
moment when conditions along the Rio Grande and in northern Mexico
were conducive for another pronunciamento against the current regime in
Mexico City. Carvajal's only incursions into Mexico late in the 1850s were
insignificant forays reminiscent of Howell Norton's raid on Reynosa. By
the eve of the American Civil War, the alleged "scourge of the Rio Grande"
ceased being a disturbance in United States-Mexican relations. By 1860
Carvajal had crossed back into Mexico, there to stay until his death in
1874. Once in Mexico he joined various rebel forces opposing the
authoritarianism of Mexico City, and when the French invaded in 1862,
Carvajal joined with the Juaristas to drive the intruders out of his country:16
From the moment he first took up arms against the centralists in 1839 until
his death over three decades later, Carvajal remained committed, heart and
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soul, to his idea of an independent northern Mexican federal republic. Like
most nor/enos today, he neither cared for nor understood the politics of
central Mexico. He knew and loved the North and wanted to create his
federalist dream there.
In retrospect, it is easy to recognize that the filibustering activities of
Carvajal's Anglo comrades marked the climax in Texas of an aggressive,
aggrandizing foreign policy which began early in the 1840s. Concealed
behind the grandiose label of "Manifest Destiny," filibustering was
associated with a militant program of tenitorial acquisition, and with what
now seems a naive, parochial, and self-righteous belief in the "redemptive"
effect of Anglo-Saxon values upon "backward" societies. Unquestionably
many of Carvajal's Anglo cohorts possessed such sentiments and were
more than likely hoping to use Carvajal as a means of eventually taking
more Mexican tenitory, either by annexing it to the United States or
establishing their own independent republic a-la-William Walker.
Whatever their ultimate designs, a good number of Carvajal's Anglo-
American allies had much more in mind than simply helping a Mexican
liberate his people.
On the other hand, it is also possible Carvajal may have been using the
Anglo filibusters and merchants rather than vice versa. If this interpretation
is allowed, then Carvajal's Anglo allies were not necessarily the "guiding
force" behind his movement. In short, Carvajal was a man who led, not one
who was being led. Though ultimately defeated by poor generalship,
nevertheless for over two years he held together rambunctious Anglo
filibusters; convinced merchants and wealthy Anglo ranchers and
entrepreneurs to loan him thousands of dollars in either goods or cash; out-
talked politicians; swayed judges; and out-foxed both the national
governments of Mexico and the United States. His defeat was not the result
of a diligent, concerted effort on behalf of the United States government.
Rather, Carvajal was defeated by factors within his movement - poor
leadership, factionalism, lack of arms and money, and myriad other
internal conflicts.
Had Carvajal been successful in separating the northern Mexican
states! he no doubt, for awhile, would have been able to sustain his republic
by sheer force of personality and will. However, given the nature of the
Anglos who rode with him, and given the fanaticism of the Southem-
Texan filibustering spirit, it would have been difficult for Carvajal to
prevent his Anglo comrades from imposing their brand of "manifest
destiny" upon his country eventually. Since most of these men had a larger
purpose in mind when they joined Carvajal, it is unlikely they would have
been content to settle in northern Mexico and live peacefully under
Mexican, albeit, federalist, rule. Carvajal likely would have been
overthrown by his former Anglo chieftains, and he and his countrymen
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would have found themselves a conquered rather than liberated people.
Luckily for the hemisphere, the United States found something more
profound to occupy itself in IS61.
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